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Multiteam systems (i.e., teams of teams) are frequently used to deal with complex and
demanding challenges that require several teams’ joint efforts. However, achieving ef-
fective horizontal coordination across component teams in these systems remains dif-
ficult. Using insights from organizational behavior research, we argue that horizontal
coordination between component teams can benefit if a multiteam system is composed
of generalist members who are acquainted with the multiple functions present in the
overall system (i.e., high intrapersonal functional diversity [IFD]). At the same time,
however, such IFD may have detrimental side effects because generalists’ broad focus
may distract them from high-impact, specialized activities (i.e., aspirational behavior).
Building on insights from organization theory, we propose that coordination across
a multiteam system’s hierarchical layers (i.e., vertical coordinated action between
a team tasked with system-wide integration and task-specialized component teams) is
critical for reaping IFD’s benefits while avoiding its costs. These notions are supported
in a sample of 236 14-person multiteam systems engaged in a realistic decision-making
simulation. Our findings illustrate how combining insights from organizational behav-
ior and organization theory can advance academic knowledge on multiteam systems
and offer practical solutions for managing such systems.
Many critical tasks in business and society are
beyond the capacity of single individuals or even
single teams (DeChurch & Zaccaro, 2010). For ex-
ample, large-scale transportation networks, military
operations (Goodwin, Essens, & Smith, 2012), emer-
gency responses (DeChurch & Mathieu, 2009), and
new product developments (Hoegl, Weinkauf, &
Gemuenden, 2004) typically require coordinated
actions of two or more teams, each of which have
distinct areas of expertise (Mathieu, Marks, &
Zaccaro, 2001). These “multiteam systems” bring
together “a complex variety of skills, knowledge, and
functions” in adaptive structures that are especially
suited to managing highly complex environments
(Zaccaro, Marks, & DeChurch, 2012: 12). They com-
prise a greater number of members and are struc-
turally more complex than standalone teams (with
distinct component teams as an additional layer),
but they are smaller, more agile, and less bureau-
cratic than traditional multi-unit organizations (e.g.,
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corporate divisions) (Davison, Hollenbeck, Barnes,
Sleesman, & Ilgen, 2012).
In order to function effectively,multiteam systems
need to combine the efforts of the component teams
responsible for operational task execution (Ford &
Schmidt, 2000; Mathieu et al., 2001; Zaccaro et al.,
2012). Such horizontal coordination represents the
extent to which component teams from the same
hierarchical level align and synchronize their ac-
tivities with each other (Lanaj, Hollenbeck, Ilgen,
Barnes, & Harmon, 2013; Marks, DeChurch, Mathieu,
Panzer, & Alonso, 2005). Effective horizontal co-
ordination enables multiteam systems to synthe-
size component teams’ distinct contributions and
utilize these teams’ complete range of specialized
resources (DeChurch & Mathieu, 2009; Marrone,
2010; Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995). Regrettably,
however, horizontal coordination is often difficult
to achieve due to multiteam systems’ sheer size
(Browning, 1998; Davison et al., 2012) and due to
misunderstandings that can arise from differences
in component teams’ languages, routines, and
thought-worlds (Zaccaro et al., 2012). Indeed, it ap-
pears notoriously difficult to effectively manage
multiteam systems, and many of the documented
performance breakdowns within such systems have
been attributed to ineffective horizontal coordina-
tion (DeChurch & Zaccaro, 2010). Prime examples
include the delayed emergency response following
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (DeChurch & Mathieu,
2009) and the loss of theMars climate orbiter in 1999
(Postrel, 2002).
Two distinct research perspectives have generated
insights intohow topromotehorizontal coordination.
The dominant line of reasoning, in this respect, de-
rives from amicro-level organizational behavior (OB)
tradition. It focuses on providing teams with the ca-
pacity for realizing horizontal coordination in a
bottom-up manner (Crichton & Flin, 2004; Ford &
Schmidt, 2000). An important strategy that has
emerged from this line of inquiry is to compose or
develop teams with broad functional generalists, in-
stead of narrow specialists (Joshi, Pandey, & Han,
2009; Park, Lim, & Birnbaum-More, 2009). Studies in
standalone, cross-functional teams, for example, have
shown that intrapersonal functional diversity (IFD),
defined as team members’ average breadth of func-
tional experience (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002), im-
proves members’ collective understanding of
each other’s specialized contexts and constraints
(Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Park et al., 2009). Simi-
larly, research on cross-training suggests that rota-
tion through functionally distinct positions broadens
members’ knowledge of shared tasks, equipment, and
functions (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, Blickensderfer, &
Bowers, 1998; Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro,
2002). Building on this logic, high IFD seems likely to
facilitate horizontal coordination between compo-
nent teams and promote multiteam system perfor-
mance (Ford & Schmidt, 2000).
There is an important caveat to this conclusion,
however, in that empirical research relating IFD to
multiteamsystemperformance is lacking. Inaddition,
research in related areas has not consistently estab-
lished IFD’s benefits for larger organizational units
with multiple (sub)groups (Leenders & Wierenga,
2002;Maltz&Kohli, 2000). In fact, increasing IFDmay
have the unintended side effect of limiting the depth
of members’ functional experiences and diminishing
their task focus (Hatvany & Pucik, 1981; Raskas &
Hambrick, 1992). Steps taken to develop broad func-
tional experience may hinder members’ specializa-
tion (Cannella et al., 2008; Tesluk & Jacobs, 1998), in
particular, because time, talent, and training budgets
are all limited resources. This may pose important
problems for multiteam systems, as members lacking
deep, comprehensive experience in a specific work
area have a tendency to avoid, rather than proactively
solve, difficult problems associated with the re-
spective area (Jans & Frazer-Jans, 2004; Postrel, 2002).
Thus, IFD’s potential benefits for horizontal coordina-
tion may come at the cost of decreased aspirational
behavior (i.e., a multiteam system’s engagement in
complex, specialized activities that push performance
boundaries [Lanaj et al., 2013]).
A second, independent research perspective may
reconcile these countervailing effects of IFD. Groun-
ded in macro-level organization theory (OT) (e.g.,
Galbraith, 1994; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), this per-
spective focuses on formal, top-down integration
mechanisms that can promote multiteam system
performance (Browning, 1998; Davison et al., 2012).
Research in this tradition has found, in particular,
that a central group of formal boundary spanners
with system-wide integrative leadership responsibil-
ities (Sherman & Keller, 2011) can support compo-
nent teams through vertical coordinated action
(i.e., “coordination that takes place between report-to
and direct reporting actors across organizational
levels whose breadth of scope and authority differ”
[Davison et al., 2012: 809]). Such vertical coordinated
action enables the integration team to transfer com-
prehensive information on system-wide task de-
mands towardcomponent teams (Davisonet al., 2012;
Galbraith, 1994) and, as such, may strengthen IFD’s
positive consequences for horizontal coordination
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and neutralize IFD’s negative implications for aspi-
rational behavior (see Figure 1).
We examined these notions in a sample of 236
multiteam systems comprising 3,304 individuals
engaged in a series of realistic computer simulations
while attending a leadership development program
with tangible career consequences. This setting en-
abled us to overcome the “onerous research obsta-
cles” (Gulati, 1998: 306) that have limited past
empirical research in this area (e.g., compiling a suf-
ficiently large sample of comparable multiteam sys-
tems [DeChurch & Zaccaro, 2010]).
Taken together, this research aims to advance our
understanding of the antecedents associated with
critical processes (horizontal coordination and as-
pirational behavior) and performance outcomes
in multiteam systems. We illustrate how combin-
ing insights from micro-level OB and macro-level
OT literatures enables important theoretical ad-
vances in multiteam system research (DeChurch &
Zaccaro, 2010; Zaccaro et al., 2012) and, more
generally, in research on collaborative task accom-
plishment (Marrone, 2010; Smith et al., 1995).
Moreover, this study is important for management
practice because it points to proximal antecedent
variables (IFD and vertical coordinated action) that
organizations can manipulate through readily
available interventions, thereby enabling managers
to shape horizontal coordination, aspirational be-
havior, and overall performance as critical, yet
difficult-to-influence, aspects of multiteam system
functioning.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
IFD as a Multiteam System Property
Consistent with previous team-level research (e.g.,
Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002), we conceptualize IFD as
a configural unit property (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000),
representing the degree to which amultiteam system is
composedofbroadgeneralistswithexperiences that are
dispersed across the system’s multiple functional do-
mains, as opposed to narrow specialists with experi-
ences focused in a single domain. Unlike interpersonal
functional diversity, which reflects differences across
members with regard to the functional domains in
which they have obtained most of their work experi-
ence, intrapersonal functional diversity considers dif-
ferentiation within individuals. As such, IFD captures
the full spectrumofmembers’work experiences (Burke
&Steensma,1998; Joshietal., 2009). IFDishighestwhen
every multiteam system member has experience in all
functional domains relevant to the system, and it is
lowest when everymember’s task-related experience is
focused in a single domain. A multiteam system’s IFD
can be increased, for example, through inter-functional
rotations, team member exchanges (Leenders &
Wierenga, 2002), and cross-training within different
functional domains (Marks et al., 2002).
IFD and Multiteam System Performance
Promoting horizontal coordination: IFD’spotential
benefits. Research originating from a micro-OB
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arguments to support IFD’s value for multiteam
systems. Scholars have noted that broad functional
backgrounds enable members to sense “the web of
relationships” (Raskas & Hambrick, 1992: 10) that
connects their activities within the overall system
and to better understand other system parts’ func-
tioning (Ford & Schmidt, 2000; Joshi et al., 2009;
Kusunoki & Numagami, 1998). Hence, IFD may
promote mutual knowledge regarding roles, tasks,
and responsibilities within a multiteam system
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1998; Ellis & Pearsall, 2011;
Marks et al., 2002). This mutual knowledge re-
duces component teams’ need to discuss and
clarify task-related issues with each other, thereby
enabling them to implicitly and seamlessly co-
ordinate efforts whenworking on joint tasks (Entin
& Serfaty, 1999; Kotha, George, & Srikanth, 2013).
Without IFD, component teams need to repeatedly
engage in cumbersome interactions because they
do not sufficiently understand each other’s special-
ized task competences, resources, and constraints
(Cramton, 2001; Kotha et al., 2013; Srikanth &
Puranam, 2011). In other words, higher IFD may
provide multiteam systems with crucial, “tacit”
mechanisms of horizontal coordination, thereby po-
tentially enabling component teams to realize such
coordination in an efficient, bottom-up manner
(Srikanth & Puranam, 2011: 855; see also Puranam,
Raveendran, & Knudsen, 2012).
Horizontal coordination, in turn, may promote
multiteam system performance by preventing re-
dundancies and inconsistencies between different
component teams’ activities (Hoegl et al., 2004; Lanaj
et al., 2013). In addition, component teams may re-
ceive crucial support from each other through hori-
zontal coordination, which enables them to better
execute key tasks for the system as a whole (Joshi
et al., 2009; Marrone, 2010). As such, horizontal co-
ordination is generally regarded as fundamental for
efficiently and effectively realizing collective out-
comes (DeChurch & Mathieu, 2009; Mathieu et al.,
2001). Research on rail-control multiteam systems,
for example, has shown such coordination to allow
component teams from various carriers, network
operators, and contractors to combine their expertise
and, thus, to effectively solve joint operational
problems (Goodwin et al., 2012).
However, IFD’s value for horizontal coordination
and multiteam system performance is not as clear-
cut as the above arguments might suggest. Despite
its well-documented importance within standalone
teams (e.g., Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Park
et al., 2009; Rulke & Galaskiewicz, 2000), IFD’s
consequences for more complex multiteam sys-
tems have not been studied. Moreover, empirical
research in larger organizational units has painted
an inconsistent picture. Parry and Song (1993), for
example, found that multifunctional members
strengthened integration between organizational
units, whereas Leenders andWierenga (2002) found
that moving personnel across different functional
departments did not aid such integration (see also
Maltz&Kohli, 2000).Hence, it is unclearwhether the
positive relation between IFD and horizontal co-
ordination (and, ultimately, performance) observed
in standalone teams will translate toward multiteam
systems.
Diminishing aspirational behavior: IFD’s po-
tential downsides. Besides IFD’s potential benefits
for horizontal coordination, it is important to note
that IFD might, at the same time, come with the un-
desirable side effect of constraining a multiteam
system’s aspirational behavior. As noted above, such
behavior reflects a system’s engagement in complex,
specialist activities that are instrumental to the re-
alization of its key strategic goals (Lanaj et al., 2013).
A primary reason for these adverse effects of IFD is
that frequent functional rotations leave members
with little time to develop specialist insights within
any particular work domain (Buyl, Boone, Hendriks,
& Matthyssens, 2011). Consequently, members may
lack the knowledge and experience required for ef-
fectively performing complex, aspirational tasks
within specific domains. Members may, then, be
tempted to forgo complex domain-specific activities
in the multiteam system (Postrel, 2002: 360) and
adopt “tactical modes of professional behavior” by
concentrating on simpler, less ambitious courses of
action (Jans & Frazer-Jans, 2004: 258).
Neglecting these adverse side effects may have
far-reaching ramifications, because aspirational be-
havior is fundamental for multiteam system perfor-
mance (Lanaj et al., 2013).To return to the exampleof
a rail-control multiteam system, it is a strategic goal
of such systems to recover as quickly and robustly as
possible from network disturbances. Accomplishing
this goal requires that a multiteam system goes be-
yond the mere treatment of surface-level symptoms
to identify and correct the root causes underlying
a disturbance (Jans & Frazer-Jans, 2004; Postrel,
2002). Limited aspirational behavior may suffice to
ameliorate a disturbance’s direct consequences, but
it is unlikely to effectively address long-term rami-
fications for the rail network as a whole. In fact, low
aspirational behavior may even hurt system per-
formance in the long run, because this approach
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typically “doubles the [subsequent] repair effort and
associated costs” (Goodwin et al., 2012: 60). In line
with this argument, previous team-level research
has found that members can realize more advanced
contributions for their team when deliberately
working towardmore difficult and aspirational goals
(Knight, Durham, & Locke, 2001). Initial empirical
work at the multiteam system level has mirrored
these findings, suggesting a positive relationship
between aspirational behavior and multiteam sys-
tem performance (Lanaj et al., 2013).
Triggering Alternative Pathways: The Role of
Vertical Coordinated Action
Interestingly, a different research paradigm—
originating from an OT tradition—may clarify IFD’s
countervailing effects in multiteam systems. The OB
perspective discussed above examines how compo-
sitional characteristics (such as IFD) shape horizon-
tal coordination and aspirational behavior in an
emergent, bottom-up manner. In contrast, the OT
perspective focuses on formal, top-down mecha-
nisms (e.g., Brown, 1999; Galbraith, 1994; Lawrence
& Lorsch, 1967). This latter perspective has identi-
fied integration teams, in particular, as crucial for
multiteam systems (Browning, 1998; Davison et al.,
2012). Integration teams are a formal part of a multi-
team system’s structure; they are responsible for
ensuring effective coordination between specialized
component teams and realization of the overall sys-
tem’s strategic goals (Davison et al., 2012; DeChurch
& Marks, 2006). For these purposes, integration
teams typically hold a central position in the flow of
work, with members dedicated to spanning bound-
aries between component teams (DeChurch&Marks,
2006; Goodwin et al., 2012). This unique role allows
integration teams to develop “big-picture in-
formation” on real-time coordination and strategic
demands in the wider system (Davison et al.,
2012: 812).
It is important to note, however, that integration
teams typically cannot singlehandedly realize
a multiteam system’s operational tasks because they
lack the time, manpower, and specialized expertise
to substitute for component teams’ efforts (Brown,
1999; Galbraith, 1994). Rather, integration teams’
core responsibility is to utilize their unique, broad
perspective to guide and support component teams’
operational task accomplishment (Galbraith, 1994).
To effectively meet this responsibility, it is cru-
cial that integration teams frequently connect with
different component teams to align task-related
matters—an internal multiteam system process we
label vertical coordinated action (Davison et al.,
2012). This process enables integration teams to
transmit and clarify their big-picture information on
coordination demands and strategic requirements
toward component teams. Component teams can
then act upon such information by engaging in hor-
izontal coordination and aspirational behavior.
Clearly, however, these potential benefits associated
with vertical coordinated action hinge on whether
component teams can put the integration team’s in-
sights to effective use—and we propose that IFD
plays a key role in this regard.
As such, we argue that OB and OT perspectives
complement each other to enable a better and more
comprehensive picture of multiteam system func-
tioning. OB research provides a useful starting
point for understanding how component teams’
capacities—as derived from IFD—may shape multi-
team system processes, but it does not speak to the
role of the organizational structure in which such
bottom-up processes take place (House, Rousseau, &
Thomas-Hunt, 1995). Macro-level OT research, on
the other hand, has considered the role of top-down
organizational context factors by focusing on formal
integration teams, but has generally ignored crucial
bottom-up factors that can implicitly organize joint
efforts (Browning, 1998; Davison et al., 2012; House
et al., 1995; for a recent exception, see Srikanth &
Puranam, 2011). Consequently, we follow recent
theoretical developments (e.g., Kotha et al., 2013;
Srikanth & Puranam, 2011; see also Gioia & Pitre,
1990) by adopting a multi-paradigm approach that
integrates insights from the OB and OT literatures to
study multiteam systems. As depicted in Figure 1,
we suggest that IFD and vertical coordinated action
are intertwined in a complex manner, with vertical
coordinated action determining whether IFD’s ad-
vantages (increased horizontal coordination) or dis-
advantages (decreased aspirational behavior) will
prevail.
The role of vertical coordinated action in the re-
lationship between IFD and horizontal coordination.
If IFD is to effectively stimulate horizontal co-
ordination within a multiteam system, it is crucial
that members have a thorough overview of system-
wide activities and coordination demands (Espinosa,
Slaughter, Kraut, & Herbsleb, 2007; Klein & Pierce,
2001). Equipped with this overview, members can
draw from their IFD and implicitly coordinate their
own component team’s activities with other teams
(DeChurch & Marks, 2006). Unfortunately, however,
multiteam systems’ large-scale and dynamic nature
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often prevents component teammembers from being
informed about all activities and coordination re-
quirements in the systemas awhole (Browning, 1998;
Davison et al., 2012). Integration teams are likely to
play a critical role in addressing this issue, because
their central location in the flow of work uniquely
positions them to gain real-time, comprehensive
information on the overall system (Brown, 1999;
DeChurch & Marks, 2006; Galbraith, 1994) and to
transfer such information to component teams through
vertical coordinated action.
Thus, we anticipate that vertical coordinated ac-
tion will strengthen the positive relationship be-
tween IFD and horizontal coordination. Multiteam
systems with high IFD have the mutual knowledge
necessary to enact implicit horizontal coordination
(Cramton, 2001), and they receive crucial infor-
mation from the integration team in order to employ
this knowledge when vertical coordinated action is
high (DeChurch & Marks, 2006). Multiteam systems
that are low in IFD, on the other hand,may be unable
to enact effective horizontal coordination evenwhen
the integration team exhibits strong vertical co-
ordinated action. In such circumstances, the system
is likely to experience difficulties in sensing re-
lationships between different teams’ activities and
implicitly structuring and aligning component teams’
contributions (Ford & Schmidt, 2000; Kusunoki &
Numagami, 1998; Srikanth & Puranam, 2011). Hence,
despite the integration team’s efforts, horizontal co-
ordination is likely to remain limited by misunder-
standings and cumbersome interaction processes
between component teams.
In contrast, IFD is less likely to positively relate
with horizontal coordination in multiteam systems
with lower vertical coordinated action. In this situ-
ation, the integration team fails to support compo-
nent teams’ horizontal coordination (Mathieu et al.,
2001). With low IFD it is clear, then, that horizontal
coordination is unlikely to occur. After all, compo-
nent teams lack the mutual knowledge required to
implicitly account for each other’s demands (Ford &
Schmidt, 2000; Joshi et al., 2009), and the integration
team provides little information to facilitate such
efforts (Davison et al., 2012; DeChurch & Marks,
2006). Thus, the difficulties of aligning actions
across component teams may overburden members’
limited capacities (Faraj & Yan, 2009; Marrone,
2010). Even multiteam systems with functionally
broad members (high IFD), however, are unlikely to
effectively use their mutual knowledge for horizon-
tal coordination when vertical coordinated action
is lacking. Under these circumstances, component
teams have to uncover coordination requirements
through explicit and cumbersome interactions be-
fore they can align their efforts (Browning, 1998;
Davison et al., 2012). Hence, without adequate in-
tegration team support, much of IFD’s potential is
likely to be spent on preparatory actions rather than
horizontal coordination itself.
Taken together, we predict that vertical co-
ordinated action will allow multiteam systems to
more effectively utilize their IFD for horizontal
coordination, thereby strengthening IFD’s perfor-
mance benefits. With little vertical coordinated
action, in contrast, these performance benefits
should remain limited, as the positive relationship
between IFD and horizontal coordination is less
likely to materialize.
Hypothesis 1. Vertical coordinated action mod-
erates the indirect relationship between IFD and
multiteam system performance, as mediated by
horizontal coordination. This positive indirect
relationship is accentuated when vertical co-
ordinated action is higher andattenuatedwhen
vertical coordinated action is lower.
The role of vertical coordinated action in the
relationship between IFD and aspirational
behavior. Besides the coordination advantages de-
scribed above, integration teams’ central role within
multiteam systems should enable them to obtain
an overarching perspective on progress against the
system’s strategic goals (DeChurch & Marks, 2006;
Galbraith, 1994; Klein & Pierce, 2001) and to
transfer strategically important information out to
component teams through vertical coordinated
action. In multiteam systems with high IFD, verti-
cal coordinated action may therefore compensate
for component teams’ pragmatic orientation to-
ward immediate and obvious tasks and away from
high-impact, yet difficult, activities (Jans & Frazer-
Jans, 2004). Under such conditions, the integration
team can emphasize core strategic directions for
the system as awhole and direct component teams’
efforts toward challenging, specialized activities
that advance such goals (Brown, 1999; Mathieu
et al., 2001). Evenmultiteam systemswith high IFD
are likely, then, to retain a focus on aspirational
activities during task execution, thereby dimin-
ishing the negative relationship between IFD and
aspirational behavior.
In contrast, IFD’s negative consequences for as-
pirational behavior should surface particularly
strongly when vertical coordinated action is less
pronounced. In such situations, the integration
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team fails to guide the system toward high-impact
and strategically important goals (Browning, 1998;
Klein & Pierce, 2001). Multiteam systems com-
prising functionally narrow specialists (low IFD)
may be able to exhibit aspirational behavior to
some degree even in this context, because mem-
bers have thorough domain-specific knowledge
that allows them to identify and execute complex
tasks related to their specialized work domain
(Postrel, 2002). In multiteam systems with high IFD,
however, generalists’ broad and relatively superficial
perspective on specialized tasks may focus them on
immediate, less challenging, and low-impact activi-
ties, anda lackof vertical coordinatedaction is likely to
exacerbate this orientation. The integration team does
little to redirect functionally broad members’ focus
toward strategic, high-impact goals in this context,
thereby sustaining the overall system’s narrow func-
tional outlook.
Taken together, we predict that strong vertical
coordinated action can compensate for IFD’s nega-
tive performance effects by diminishing the inverse
association between IFD and aspirational behavior.
With low vertical coordinated action, however, in-
creasing IFD is likely to go along with substantial
decrements in aspirational behavior and, thus,
to deteriorate a multiteam system’s performance
outcomes.
Hypothesis 2. Vertical coordinated action mod-
erates the indirect relationship between IFD
and multiteam system performance, as medi-
ated by aspirational behavior. This negative in-
direct relationship is accentuated when vertical
coordinated action is lower and attenuated
when vertical coordinated action is higher.
METHODS
Research Design and Sample
We tested our hypotheses using a sample com-
prised of 3,304 United States Air Force officers at-
tending a five-week leadership development course.
Participants represented a broad range of job cate-
gories and had between five and nine years of pro-
fessional work experience. As part of the course,
participants were assigned to 236 fourteen-person
multiteam systems that worked together on a series
of realistic computer-based decision-making simu-
lations (i.e., the Leadership Development Simula-
tion [LDS]). These simulations formed the basis for
the present study. During the simulations, partici-
pants dealt with tasks that were highly similar to
their regular jobs. Their performance was part of
their overall course evaluations and influenced fu-
ture advancement and promotion opportunities. As
such, this study combined elements of both labora-
tory (e.g., high control and standardization across all
multiteam systems) and field (e.g., a realistic sample
with tangible consequences tied to participants’ task
performance) research.
Each multiteam system participated in three in-
dependent LDS sessions (with equivalent pro-
cedures and identical membership) during the
course of the leadership development program. Data
for the present investigation is mainly based on the
third and final simulation session. Air Force trainers
assigned participants to a specific multiteam system
to ensure competitive fairness and equivalent com-
position (e.g., in terms of age, gender, occupational
category, etc.). In addition, task difficulty and com-
plexity was held constant by using the exact same
configuration of the simulation across all 236 multi-
team systems within each of the LDS sections. All
participants received comprehensive training prior
to their first LDS session, which included reading
material, an illustrated presentation, and three
practice rounds. Moreover, the multiteam systems
received a limited intelligence briefing, and could
use 10 minutes before the start of a simulation ses-
sion for initial planning and goal setting. The multi-
team systems then participated in computer-based
simulations lasting roughly 120minutes per session.
This study was part of a larger research program
designed to comprehensively advance scientific
knowledge on multiteam systems. We were unable
to control or manipulate IFD in this context (e.g.,
through random assignment to different IFD condi-
tions), because (a) simulation results had tangible
implications for participants’ career advancement
and (b) we expected potential disadvantages associ-
ated with IFD (e.g., reduced aspirational behavior).
Hence, we used a priori screening criteria to select
comparable multiteam systems from the overall re-
search program that had similar opportunities to
develop and apply IFD (for similar approaches, see
Holloway&Parmigiani, 2014; Reuer &Devarakonda,
2015; Schulze, Lubatkin, &Dino, 2003). Specifically,
we included all multiteam systems that had
remained (a) intact across all three LDS sessions
(i.e., no membership additions or losses), and (b)
stable after developing different levels of IFD across
the first and second LDS sessions (i.e., no changes in
members’ functional roles between the second and
third sessions). These criteria built on the notion that
(a) IFD andperformance in the third and final session
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are only comparable between multiteam systems
with constant membership, and (b) IFD’s implica-
tions could fully surface in the final session only in
multiteam systems that had finished developing IFD
after the second session. With regard to the latter
point, we expectedmultiteam systems to experience
performance decrements during the process of de-
veloping IFD, as its members rotated toward new
functional domains and needed to adjust to an un-
familiar task. These performance decrements should
be temporary, however, as they reflect short-term
adjustment problems rather than general IFD charac-
teristics (i.e., members’ broad, yet superficial, expe-
riences). By focusing on multiteam systems that had
finisheddeveloping IFD after the secondLDS session,
we could prevent such temporal problems from con-
founding IFD’s effects during the third session.
As is common in large-scale research efforts
(e.g., Huxham & Vangen, 2000), the overall research
programwas designed to produce several studies on
different aspects of multiteam system functioning.
Consequently, some of the multiteam systems in the
present sample (39 to 47%) had also been used in
prior studies (Davison et al., 2012; Firth, Hollenbeck,
Miles, Ilgen, & Barnes, 2014; Lanaj et al., 2013).1
Importantly, however, the data from the third LDS
session used here have not been previously exam-
ined, and no other study in this program has exam-
ined IFD. The present study is thus unique both
empirically and conceptually. In addition, we note
that our results are robust when controlling for key
variables included in previous studies.
Multiteam System Simulation
Task. The LDS was a computer-based simulation
during which all 14 participants within a multiteam
systemwere colocated and free to communicatewith
each other.2 The simulation created a complex and
dynamic task environment that required multiteam
system members to work interdependently and un-
der time pressure to deploy a large number of assets
(i.e., remotely piloted aircraft [RPAs] and intelligence
assets) to achieve the commongoal ofmaximizing the
system’s overall point score. Points could be gained
by successfully engaging a variety of targets hidden in
a 256-cell task environment, and points were lost
when RPAs or their home base were attacked.
Targets’ point value varied by size and class, with
large “opportunities” carrying the highest and small
“threats” carrying the lowest value. Threats (but not
opportunities) had the ability to attack RPAs and the
home base. To increase environmental uncertainty
and problem-solving workload, target types were
initially disguised for half of the targets in the third
session. Participants therefore had to collaboratively
engage in a process of exploration, experiential
learning, and reasoning to discover these targets’ at-
tributes. Initial target placements, as well as target
types and movements, were identical for all multi-
team systems.
Multiteam system composition and roles. Mul-
titeam systems contained three types of teams: two
component teams (point and support) and an in-
tegration team. The point team’s primary role was to
engage targets, whereas the support team’s role was
to provide intelligence on targets’ location and
identity. Each of the two component teams com-
prised four staff members with specific operational
responsibilities, as well as two boundary spanners
(denoted director and assistant director). The point
team’s individual staff members each controlled one
category of identical RPAs with unique capabilities
(i.e., “Strike” for engaging opportunities, “Escort”
for neutralizing threats, “Info” for providing in-
formation on targets’ identity, and “Refuel” for
refueling other RPAs for long-distance missions).
Moreover, each of the four support team staff mem-
bers controlled one unique category of intelligence
assetswith distinct “sweet spots” (i.e., a limited zone
in the simulation environment in which the re-
spective asset provided reliable information on tar-
get identity). Intelligence assets’ sweet spots were
unknown at the start of the simulation, and partici-
pants thus had to uncover these zones through col-
lective exploration and shared learning.
Multiteam systems also included an integration
team, which comprised the four boundary spanners
from the component teams and two additional
members (denoted mission commander and vice
commander). This integration team was tasked with
a boundary-spanning role to facilitate component
teams’ cooperation and task accomplishment.
Scholars have noted that enactment of this role can
vary along a continuum from “liaison” to “in-
tegrative leadership.” Liaison roles employ non-
hierarchical means (e.g., information collection and
dissemination), whereas integrative leadership roles
rely on formal decision authority (Galbraith, 1994;
Sherman & Keller, 2011; Sinha & Van de Ven, 2005).
In the present case, one half of the integration team
1 A detailed description of the overlap between studies’
samples is available from the second author upon request.
2 See Davison et al. (2012) for a detailed description of
LDS.
1830 OctoberAcademy of Management Journal
(the vice commander and assistant directors) enac-
ted liaison roles without formal authority, whereas
the other half (the mission commander and the two
directors) had integrative leadership roles. All of
these members were required to work closely to-
gether as a team to effectively meet their joint re-
sponsibilities. Liaison members, in particular, had
a supportive function within the integration team;
their core task was to assist decision making by col-
lecting, integrating, and disseminating information
on component teams’ actions. Integrative leaders
critically required such information to make pur-
poseful leadership decisions, whereas liaisons
needed integrative leaders’ inputs and feedback to
guide their information collection activities and en-
able them to effectively prepare and communicate
such information.
A distinctive feature of the multiteam systems
studied here is that a system’s individual teams had
to collaborate to jointly ensure the system’s overall
success. Integration teams, for example, lacked the
capacity for deploying all assets in a timely and ef-
fective manner; as such, they required component
teams’ contributions for operational task accom-
plishment. Component teams, in turn, were ill po-
sitioned to uncover broad, overarching information
about coordination demands and strategic task re-
quirements in the system as a whole; consequently,
they depended on the integration team for such in-
sights. Finally, there was considerable interdepen-
dency between component teams. Point teamshad to
rely on support team intelligence to effectively de-
ploy their RPAs, and support teams required point
team input to identify intelligence assets’ sweet
spots and efficaciously enact intelligence-gathering
activities.
Simulation setup. Participants were presented
with a blank grid representing the task environment
at the start of a simulation. Hidden throughout the
grid were threat and opportunity targets that varied
along the aforementioned attributes. As previously
discussed, threats that attacked RPAs and the home
base resulted in point losses, and points could be
earned when neutralizing threats. Opportunities
similarly earned points for the multiteam system
when engaged successfully, but they posed no threat
of attack. To illustrate the simulation’s complexity,
we note that different RPAs were needed to engage
different types of targets, and that successful neu-
tralization of some targets required simultaneous
attacks through multiple RPAs. In addition, some
targets remained in the same location during the
entire simulation, whereas others moved around the
simulation grid. Any location in the task environ-
ment could be void of targets or could contain one or
two targets.
A complete LDS session consisted of 10 decision-
making rounds. In each round, component team
members first recommended specific asset de-
ployments to their director. Directors then re-
viewed these recommendations, made alterations if
deemed appropriate, and passed the revised set of
recommendations on to themission commander for
his or her review, alteration, and final approval. A
multiteam system’s RPAs and intelligence assets
were then deployed and interacted with the simu-
lation environment according to this final set of
decisions. Collectively, the deployment process
required 144 decisions in each round within a lim-
ited amount of time. Component team members
received feedback on their assets’ interactions with
the task environment and had a limited amount of
time afterward to analyze this feedback and plan
deployments for subsequent rounds. Successfully
engaged targets were removed from the task envi-
ronment, whereas destroyed RPAs were replaced
at the start of the next round. All in all, effective
performance required a multiteam system to col-
lectively manage a large number of RPAs and in-
telligence assets under pressure of time in order to
successfully pursue different types of opportunities
and neutralize diverse threats.
Information management. Each multiteam sys-
tem used an information exchange system called the
Common Operating Picture (COP)—a digital map of
the task environment that provided a means of
sharing information regarding encountered targets’
type and location. Component teams could employ
the COP to record information on self-identified
targets for future reference and to organize collective
task achievement. The support team, for example,
could employ theCOP toprovide thepoint teamwith
intelligence about potential targets, whereas the
point team could utilize the COP to give feedback on
the accuracy of such intelligence. Based on this in-
formation, component teams could then develop
subsequent deployments. Importantly, use of the
COP was not obligatory; the point team was free to
rely exclusively on knowledge gathered by its own
assets, and the support team could rely solely on the
formal feedback provided in the LDS. In addition,
given its retrospective nature, the COP did not con-
vey any information concerning component teams’
planned asset deployments.
The integration team’s liaison members (i.e., the
vice-commander and assistant directors) facilitated
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the component teams’ use of the COP by updating it
when new targets had been uncovered or known
targets had been destroyed. Liaison members did
not have direct access to the information needed to
update the COP, however; they were dependent on
input from the component teams. Moreover, the
integration teams’ liaison members did not have the
authority to prescribe the information component
teams would gather for display on the COP or to en-
force the use of such information for subsequent
deployments.
Measures
Consistent with previous research using the LDS,
all constructs in this study were conceptualized as
configural unit properties (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000)
at the multiteam system level of analysis.
Intrapersonal functional diversity. We oper-
ationalized IFD as the proportion of members in
a multiteam system that had acquired experiences
across different functional domains during the first
two LDS sessions (see Park et al., 2009, for a similar
approach). Specifically, during the first LDS session
individual participants worked in one of the four
distinct functionsdescribedaboveand, consequently,
gained hands-on experience in the respective domain
(i.e., operations [point team], intelligence [support
team], and liaison or integrative leadership [in-
tegration team]). For the second LDS session, some
participants remained within their original function,
whereas others switched to a different domain. No-
tably, due to the screening criteria described above,
participants in our sample did not change domains
between the second and third sessions. Further,
members remained within the same multiteam
system across LDS sessions, such that functional
rotations only took place within (not between) the
respective systems. We note that the decision to
switch members’ functional domains was within
a multiteam system’s own discretion. Consistent
with prior team-level research (e.g., Bunderson &
Sutcliffe, 2002; Buyl et al., 2011; Cannella et al.,
2008), we capitalized on these naturally occurring
role transfers to capture IFD.
Whether participants rotated between different
domains had important implications for their func-
tional knowledge. The LDS was designed to enable
participants to grasp a domain’s basic tasks, de-
mands, and constraints within a single session. At
the same time, the simulation’s dynamism and dif-
ficulty made it virtually impossible to develop so-
phisticated, specialized knowledge in a functional
domain after a single episode. Different LDS sessions
had different target distributions, therefore exposing
participants to unique challenges that forced them to
rethink and refine their existing knowledge. Hence,
participants that remained in the same function for
two consecutive sessions could reflect on their ac-
tions from the first session, get feedback, and try out
different solutions in the second session. These
participants were able, therefore, to develop deeper,
more specialized knowledge compared to partici-
pants who switched to a different function after the
first session.
These advantages notwithstanding, remaining in
a single domain also limited participants’ breadth of
functional knowledge. Different LDS domains posed
distinct challenges and, thus, it was not possible for
members to simply apply what they had learned in
one function toward other domains. Experience in
the support team (such as finding assets’ sweet
spots), for example, provided little help with the
point team’s specific challenges (such as destroying
hostile targets while keeping the home base pro-
tected). Hence, only participants that switched be-
tween functional domains during consecutive LDS
sessions had the opportunity to develop broad, gen-
eralist functional knowledge, although these partic-
ipants could not deepen their knowledge within any
single domain.
Overall, 63% of our study participants remained
in their initial functional domain after the first LDS
session, and 37% switched to a different domain.
Importantly, the number of participants switching
functional roles within a multiteam system differed
considerably across the systems in our sample,
ranging from 0 to 14 (all) members (M 5 5.18; SD 5
4.59). After the second simulation session, therefore,
the degree to which multiteam systems comprised
specialist members with narrow experiences
(i.e., experiences in only one functional domain)
versus generalist memberswith broader experiences
(i.e., experiences in two functional domains) varied
widely. In addition, the present measure of IFD was
normally distributed (skewness 5 .34, n.s.) and un-
related to past multiteam system performance (r 5
.12, n.s.), past horizontal coordination (r5 –.08, n.s.),
past aspirational behavior (r 5 –.07, n.s.), and past
vertical coordinated action (r5 –.01, n.s.). Hence,we
can rule out some important confounds with regard
to our key independent variable.
Horizontal coordination. Consistent with Lanaj
et al. (2013),wemeasuredhorizontal coordination as
the number of point team missions based upon in-
telligence discovered by the support team in the
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preceding rounds and captured on the COP.3 A large
number of such missions indicates effective hori-
zontal coordination, such that (a) the support team
has accurately anticipated the point teams’ infor-
mation requirements, has aligned its asset de-
ployments accordingly, and has shared the resulting
intelligence on the COP, and (b) the point team has
understood the respective information’s relevance
and has acted upon it in a timely manner. Impor-
tantly, horizontal coordination does not simply de-
note component teams’ general use of the COP, since
the support team could also share intelligence on the
COP that was not useful for the point team (and was
therefore not used for point team missions), and the
point team could also display (and later engage) self-
identified targets on the COP.
Besides horizontal coordination between overall
component teams (as captured in thepresentmeasure
[Lanaj et al., 2013]), scholars have also discussed dy-
adic coordination between individual component
team members (Davison et al., 2012). We focused on
horizontal coordination across the multiteam system
as a whole because such coordination represents
synergistic efforts that can facilitate overall system
performance (e.g., DeChurch & Marks, 2006; Lanaj
et al., 2013; Marrone, 2010). The consequences of in-
dividualmembers’dyadic coordination are less clear;
these activities may align with or counteract the ac-
tions of other multiteam system parts and, therefore,
may have ambiguous performance effects (Davison
et al., 2012; Klein & Pierce, 2001).
Aspirational behavior. Although aspirational
behavior may be diverse, multifaceted, and difficult
tomeasure in the field, thepresent laboratory context
provided a controlled setting that enabled clear-cut,
behavioral measurement of this construct. In par-
ticular, targets in the LDS varied considerably in
value (i.e., points to be gained by engaging a target),
and it was imperative that multiteam systems pur-
sued high-value targets to achieve high overall per-
formance. At the same time, these high-value targets
were particularly difficult to engage because they
were (a) located in the remote half of the task envi-
ronment and (b) well protected and mobile. Conse-
quently, successful engagement of these targets
required simultaneous deployment of multiple spe-
cialized RPAs (e.g., strike, refuel, and escort), and
members had to deliberately forgo less challenging
targets to pursue these opportunities. Multiteam
system members were informed during pre-
simulation briefings on both the importance and
difficulty of pursuing high-value targets.
We therefore captured aspirational behavior as the
number of operations missions sent to the remote
half of the task environment in pursuit of high-value
targets.4 This measure represents a prime form of
aspirational behavior in the present context, reflect-
ing ahighly complex, specialized typeof activity that
pushes a multiteam system’s performance bound-
aries (Lanaj et al., 2013). A system exhibited high
aspirational behavior, in particular, when its mem-
bers frequently pursued remote, valuable targets
with complex “packages” of multiple RPAs. In con-
trast, when a system was low in aspirational behav-
ior, most of its missions involved single RPAs
directed at low-value targets that did not require
refueling (because theywere close to the base), escort
(because they were unprotected), or tracking (be-
cause they were stationary).
Vertical coordinated action. Integration team
members with leadership roles (i.e., the mission
commander and directors) had formal authority to
modify and accept component teams’ asset de-
ployment decisions. Following Davison et al. (2012),
weoperationalizedvertical coordinated action as the
number of lower-level decisions modified in this
process. We reverse-coded this measure, such that
higher values (less modification) represent greater
vertical coordinated action.5
3 Lanaj et al. (2013) reverse coded this measure to cap-
ture component teams’ failure to engage in horizontal co-
ordination. Inthepresentmanuscript,horizontalcoordination
is not reverse coded; higher scores thus denote greater hori-
zontal coordination.
4 Aspirational behavior is conceptually different from
risk taking. Although high-impact specialized tasks may
pose risks in some circumstances, this is not a defining
feature of such aspirational behavior (i.e., there may be
high-impact tasks that involve little risk [Lanaj et al.,
2013]). Correspondingly, in the present sample, aspira-
tional behavior and risk taking (i.e., the number of unes-
corted deployments to unknown areas where assets’
safetywas unclear)weremoderately positively correlated
(r 5 .38, p , .01).
5 Multiteam systems controlled 16 RPAs and 32 in-
telligence assets; consequently, the integration team could
modify twice as many support team decisions as point
team decisions. To prevent distortion, we therefore stan-
dardized modifications within component teams before
calculating an average multiteam system score. We note
that a validation study byDavison et al. (2012) found this
vertical coordinated action measure to positively relate
with participants’ perceptions of vertical coordination
(r 5 .43, p , .05; corrected for attenuation).
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With high vertical coordinated action, asset de-
ployment decisions were aligned and coherent
across hierarchical layers in the multiteam system
and, thus, there was no reason to modify compo-
nent team decisions (Davison et al., 2012). Im-
portantly, given the large number of deployment
alternatives in the simulation, it is implausible
that integration and component teams would co-
incidentally agree on a coherent set of decisions.
In addition, considering that participants were
observed for promotion, it is unlikely that in-
tegration team leaders would passively and un-
critically accept component team decisions.6
Hence, few higher-level modifications reflect high
vertical coordinated action. In case of low vertical
coordinated action, on the other hand, asset de-
ployment decisions were misaligned and in-
compatible across hierarchical layers, causing the
integration team to veto or change a large number
of component team decisions. Hence, many
higher-level modifications reflect a relative lack of
vertical coordinated action.
We note that the present measure of vertical co-
ordinated action (drawn from Davison et al., 2012)
differs from the vertical coordination dimension
within Lanaj et al.’s (2013) broader coordination
failures construct. Whereas Lanaj et al. (2013) mea-
sured only instances in which a lack of vertical co-
ordination affected multiteam system performance,
our measure captures vertical coordinated action
without regard for its performance consequences. As
such, the current measure is appropriate for the
present purposes.
Multiteam system performance. We operation-
alized a multiteam system’s performance as the sum
of points gained from successfully engaging targets
minus points lost through hostile attacks during the
third LDS session. This measure represents a sys-
tem’s collective, overall performance (Davison et al.,
2012; Lanaj et al., 2013).
Control variables. To rule out possible biases
from differences in training effectiveness and task
mastery, we controlled for multiteam system per-
formance during the LDS session immediately pre-
ceding the one reported here (i.e., session 2) when
examining performance consequences of horizontal
coordination and aspirational behavior.
Data Analysis
We used hierarchical linear regressions at the
multiteam system level to test the interactive re-
lationships of IFD and vertical coordinated action
with the mediators (horizontal coordination and as-
pirational behavior), as well as the relationships
between these mediators and multiteam system
performance. Further, to examine the fullmoderated-
mediation hypotheses, we used a bootstrap approach
to estimate indirect relationships between IFD and
multiteam system performance (mediated by hori-
zontal coordination and aspirational behavior) at
higher and lower levels of vertical coordinated action
(61 SD). We interpreted bias-corrected 95% confi-
dence intervals to assess the conditional indirect
relationships’ statistical significance (Edwards &
Lambert, 2007). We standardized all predictor vari-
ables prior to the analyses.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 depicts means, standard deviations, and
bivariate correlations for all variables. As expected,
the direct associations of IFD with horizontal co-
ordination (r 5 .09, n.s.) and aspirational behavior
(r5 –.03, n.s.) were non-significant, underlining the
potential relevance of considering moderating fac-
tors for these relationships. In addition, previous
performance was significantly related with multi-
team system performance in the focal, third LDS
session (r 5 .31, p , .01) and, therefore, was an im-
portant covariate (Becker, 2005).
Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the indirect, positive
association between IFD and multiteam system per-
formance, through horizontal coordination, would
be stronger when vertical coordinated action was
higher rather than lower. To test this hypothesis, we
first regressed horizontal coordination on IFD, ver-
tical coordinated action, and themultiplicative term
of IFD 3 vertical coordinated action. As shown in
Table 2, we found a significant interactive relation-
ship (B 5 1.84, SE 5 .86, p , .05). The association
between IFD and horizontal coordination was posi-
tive when vertical coordinated action was higher
(simple slope at 11 SD 5 2.80, SE 5 1.15, p , .05),
whereas this relation did not reach significance
when vertical coordinated action was lower (simple
slope at –1 SD 5 –0.87, SE 5 1.26, n.s.). We then
6 During observations of the multiteam systems and
debriefing sessions, we did not encounter any behaviors
that would suggest a lack of engagement or commitment.
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examined the performance implications of horizontal
coordination. Even when controlling for past perfor-
mance, IFD, and aspirational behavior, we found
a significant positive relationship between horizontal
coordination andmultiteam system performance (B5
7.50, SE5 2.87, p, .01; see Table 3).
In the final step of examining Hypothesis 1, we
inspected the conditional indirect relationship be-
tween IFD and multiteam system performance, as
mediated by horizontal coordination, at different
values of vertical coordinated action. This indirect
relationship was positive at higher levels of vertical
coordinated action (indirect relationship at11 SD5
20.99; 95% bootstrap CI 5 3.90 to 55.22). The in-
direct relationship was non-significant, however,
whenvertical coordinated actionwas lower (indirect
relationship at –1 SD 5 –6.55; 95% bootstrap CI 5
–34.49 to 9.91). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the indirect, negative
relationship between IFD and multiteam system per-
formance, through reduced aspirational behavior,
would bemore pronouncedwhen vertical coordinated
action was lower rather than higher. We found a sig-
nificant interactive relationship between IFD, vertical
coordinated action, and aspirational behavior (B 5
2.57, SE5 1.00, p, .05; see Table 2). The association
between IFD and aspirational behavior was negative
when vertical coordinated action was lower (simple
slope at –1 SD 5 –3.32, SE 5 1.46, p , .05) but non-
significant when vertical coordinated action was
higher (simple slope at11 SD5 1.81, SE5 1.33, n.s.).
AsshowninTable3, aspirationalbehaviorwas, in turn,
positively related to multiteam system performance,
even after controlling for past performance, IFD, and
horizontal coordination (B5 5.90, SE5 2.86, p, .05).
Tests of the overall conditional indirect association
showed a negative indirect relationship between IFD
and multiteam system performance, through aspira-
tional behavior, under conditions of lower vertical
coordinated action (indirect relationship at –1 SD 5
–19.59; 95% bootstrap CI 5 –59.20 to –1.25). This
indirect relationship did not reach significance,
however, when vertical coordinated action was
higher (indirect relationship at11 SD5 10.68; 95%
bootstrap CI 5 –3.24 to 37.98). Thus, Hypothesis 2
was supported.
Figure 2 illustrates the results for the conditional
indirect relationships proposed in Hypotheses 1 and
2.7 As shown inFigure 2a, higher vertical coordinated
action accentuated IFD’s positive performance im-
plications (through horizontal coordination) and
attenuated its negative consequences (through as-
pirational behavior). In contrast, Figure 2b shows
that lower vertical coordinated action accentuated
IFD’s negative performance implications (through
aspirational behavior) while attenuating its positive
consequences (through horizontal coordination).
We employed binomial effect size displays to as-
sess our results’ practical significance (Rosenthal &
Rubin, 1982). Specifically, we examined the impli-
cations of the “best-case scenario” advanced in this
research (i.e., high IFD combined with high vertical
coordinated action) for multiteam systems’ perfor-
mance. In our sample of 236 multiteam systems,
TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
r
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Past performance 161.93 43.12
2. IFD 0.37 0.33 0.09
3. Vertical coordinated action 0.17 2.36 –0.07 0.05
4. Horizontal coordination 51.50 13.20 0.07 0.09 0.20**
5. Aspirational behavior 85.05 15.04 –0.08 –0.03 0.07 0.02
6. Future performance 139.25 46.80 0.31** –0.04 0.04 0.18* 0.11
Note: n 5 236 multiteam systems.
*p , .05
**p , .01
7 The interactive relationship between IFD, vertical co-
ordinated action, and horizontal coordination remained
almost identical when controlling for prior horizontal co-
ordination (B 5 1.58, SE 5 .82, p 5 .05). Similarly, the
interactive relationship between IFD, vertical coordinated
action, and aspirational behavior remained almost identi-
cal when controlling for prior aspirational behavior (B 5
1.96,SE5 .95,p, .05). Finally, all findings for aspirational
behavior remained robust when controlling for risk taking.
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6.4% (i.e., 15 systems) had both IFD and vertical
coordinated action scores at one standard deviation
or more above the mean. These multiteam systems
were clearly overrepresented among the top-
performing systems, with 16% of the top-25 per-
formers exhibiting a best-case scenario. In fact,
multiteam systems with high IFD and high vertical
coordinated action were 2.5 times more likely to be
in the top 25 compared to systems with lower IFD or
vertical coordinated action. Moreover, multiteam
systems exhibiting a “best-case scenario” were un-
derrepresented among the worst-performing sys-
tems in our sample, representing only 4% of the
bottom-25 performers. Thus, multiteam systems
with high IFD and high vertical coordinated action
were 1.6 times less likely than others to experience
mission failure. These findings indicate that our re-
sults are not only statistically significant but also
have tangible relevance from a practical perspective.
DISCUSSION
Multiteam systems are increasingly being used to
accomplish a wide array of complex tasks, ranging
from large-scale research and development projects
to military operations and disaster relief (Goodwin
et al., 2012; Hoegl et al., 2004). Although such sys-
tems have the potential to flexibly and effectively
cope with challenges beyond the means of other or-
ganizational forms, research has demonstrated that
they do not live up to their promise in many cases
(DeChurch & Mathieu, 2009; Donahue & Tuohy,
2006). The present study takes important steps to
address this issue. It is among the first to investigate
IFD as a key predictor of multiteam system perfor-
mance. In doing so, it extends previous research on
the role of IFD in standalone teams and larger orga-
nizations where results have been contradictory, and
it presents a unified model that reconciles these past
discrepancies within a multiteam system context.
These results can advance the way scholars think
about the role of IFD and, more generally, about multi-
team system management. Specifically, our findings
indicate that neither the positive relationships between
IFDandperformancereportedinresearchonstandalone
teams (e.g., Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Park et al.,
2009) nor the negative performance implications of IFD
reported in research on larger organizations (e.g., Buyl
et al., 2011; Postrel, 2002) generalize toward multiteam
systems in a straightforward manner. Rather, IFD ap-
pears to be a double-edged sword in this context. On the
onehand,we foundevidence for apotentially beneficial
role, in that IFD can promote multiteam systems’ hori-
zontalcoordination.Ontheotherhand,our findingsalso
point toward potential downsides, with IFD restraining
systems’ aspirational behavior. Thus, the performance
implications of IFD in multiteam systems are more
complex than previous research would suggest. It
TABLE 3
Horizontal Coordination, Aspirational Behavior, and
Multiteam System Performance
Multiteam system performance
Step 1 Step 2
Past performance 14.81 (2.92)** 14.85 (2.88)**
IFD 23.08 (2.92) 23.61 (2.87)
Horizontal coordination 7.50 (2.87)**
Aspirational behavior 5.90 (2.86)*
R-square (adjusted) 0.093** 0.128**
R-square change 0.035**
Note: n 5 236 multiteam systems. Unstandardized regression





IFD, Horizontal Coordination, and Aspirational Behavior
Horizontal coordination Aspirational behavior
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
IFD 1.13 (.85) 0.96 (.84) –0.52 (.98) –0.76 (.98)
Vertical coordinated action (VC) 2.54 (.85)** 2.65 (.84)** 1.03 (.98) 1.19 (.97)
IFD 3 VC 1.84 (.86)* 2.57 (1.00)*
R-square (adjusted) 0.038** 0.052** 0.000 0.021*
R-square change 0.014* 0.021*
Note: n 5 236 multiteam systems. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown; standard errors are noted within parentheses.
*p , .05
**p , .01
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appears that members with broad functional expe-
rience offer great potential for such systems but, at
the same time, pose unique managerial challenges.
Our results further suggest that both the positive
and the negative performance consequences of IFD
are contingent on a common boundary condition.
Namely, vertical coordinated action plays a crucial
moderating role, enabling amultiteam system to reap
IFD’s benefitswhilemitigating associated drawbacks.
Although multiteam systems are prototypically less
hierarchical than traditional organizations (Davison
et al., 2012; Mathieu et al., 2001), these results show
that vertical coordinated action by a central team
tasked with integrative leadership responsibilities is
a key success factor even in this organizational form.
These findings contribute to research on multiteam
systemsandcollaborative teamstructures byadvancing
both micro-level OB and macro-level OT perspectives
on such arrangements’ effectiveness and, most impor-
tantly, by illustrating how these distinct perspectives
can be fruitfully integrated. Research following an OB
approach, on the one hand, has emphasized IFD’s role
for effective coordination and task accomplishment
(Ford & Schmidt, 2000; Joshi et al., 2009). Typically,
however, this literature has examined IFD within
standalone teams (Bunderson&Sutcliffe, 2002;Park
et al., 2009; Rulke & Galaskiewicz, 2000), and has
consequentially neglected the larger organizational
context in which teams’ bottom-up potentials for co-
ordination may unfold. Even to the extent that these
studies have examined strategies for promoting IFD
(e.g., personnel transfer, cross-functional job rotation)
alongside contextual, top-down integration mecha-
nisms (e.g., reward schemes, colocation [Leenders &
Wierenga, 2002; Maltz & Kohli, 2000]), this research
has considered such mechanisms as an alternative
(rather than a supplement) to IFD. The present man-
uscript addresses this issue by illustrating the fact that
IFD’s effects may critically depend on formal in-
tegration teams’ efforts, thus advancing OB-based
theories of multiteam system functioning by embed-
ding component teams’ emergent potentials for hori-
zontal coordination within their larger context.
Multiteam system research originating from
an OT tradition, on the other hand, has discussed
integration teams’ importance for enabling hori-
zontal coordination in differentiated team struc-
tures (Browning, 1998; Davison et al., 2012).
Empirical studies on this issue have concluded,
however, that integration teams’ effectiveness of-
ten remains “questionable,” emphasizing the need to
more closely examine determinants of such effective-
ness (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967: 13; see also Dewsnap
& Jobber, 2009). Addressing this ambiguity, our
FIGURE 2a














Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown; significant indirect paths are indicated with thick arrows.
* p , .05
** p , .01
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findings illustrate that an integration team’s mere
presence (i.e., a purely structural solution) may not
be sufficient; an integration team’s benefits for hori-
zontal coordination, aspirational behavior, and
multiteam system performance hinge on the degree
to which this team actively aligns its activities with
component teams (i.e., vertical coordinatedaction). In
addition, our study shows that in order to fully un-
derstand vertical coordinated action’s role, one needs
to consider this top-down integration mechanism in
conjunction with a multiteam system’s bottom-up po-
tentials for coordinated task achievement (as derived
from IFD). To effectively resolve multiteam systems’
performance challenges, integration teams need to ac-
tively support component teams in utilizing their ca-
pacities for horizontal coordination, while preventing
the negative side effects such capacities may entail
(e.g., reduced aspirational behavior).
Finally, these findings advance new insights on the
functioning of multiteam systems. Multiteam system
scholars have typically considered top-down guidance
and bottom-up emergence of horizontal coordination
as alternative, mutually exclusive strategies toward
realizing collective efforts. Lanaj et al. (2013), for ex-
ample, suggested that it is more effective to rely on in-
tegration teams, rather than component teams, for
managing critical coordination processes. This may,
however, have oversimplified the complex reality
within dynamic multiteam settings (Lewis, 2000),
where integrative leaders and lower-level members
need to combine top-down support and bottom-up ef-
forts in order to effectively coordinate work. By in-
tegrating OB and OT insights, the present research
showshowcentral integration teamsanddecentralized
component teams can mutually support coordination
inacomplementaryway, therebypromotingmultiteam
system success. As such, this study advances a new
approach for multiteam system theory that capitalizes
on component teams’ distinct capacities as well as
formal integrative leaders’ efforts.
Limitations
Thepresent researchhas several strengths, including
a large sample of multiteam systems observed in a rig-
orously controlled setting with a high degree of psy-
chological realism (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982).
Nevertheless, some limitations should be taken into
considerationwhen interpretingour findings.Asnoted
above, ethical and practical issues precluded us from
manipulating IFD and randomly assigning multiteam
systems to distinct conditions. Given that our model is
in line with previous theoretical work that has identi-
fied IFDasapotential antecedentofmultiteamsystems’
FIGURE 2b












Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown; significant indirect paths are indicated with thick arrows.
* p , .05
** p , .01
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coordination and performance (e.g., Ford & Schmidt,
2000),wehavesomeconfidence in thepredictedcausal
directions. Nonetheless, we recognize a need for more
evidence based on experimental designs with random
assignment before causal inference is justified. More-
over, we did not capture multiteam systems’ rationale
for developing IFD.Hence, although IFDwasunrelated
to prior multiteam system processes and performance,
we cannot ascertain participants’ motivation for rotat-
ing to a different functional domain. Importantly,
however, the natural emergence of IFD in the present
multiteam systems appears consistent with IFD’s de-
velopment in many “traditional” organizations, where
members can typically exert a certain degree of influ-
ence over their own functional development (e.g., by
taking on a different job [Higgins, 2001; Vardi, 1980]).
Further, some real-life multiteam systems may
contain more members and teams compared to the
systems studied here (Goodwin et al., 2012). At the
same time, multiteam systems represent an in-
termediateorganizational form, locatedbetween large
organizations or collaboration networks and stand-
alone teams. Thus, multiteam systems comprising as
few as two or three teams are not uncommon, as re-
flected in the definition of this type of organization
(i.e., “two or more teams that interface directly and
interdependently in response to environmental con-
tingencies toward the accomplishment of collective
goals”; Mathieu et al., 2001: 290). In addition, the
number and size of the multiteam systems studied
here compares favorably with prior experimental re-
search (for a review, seeDavison&Hollenbeck, 2012).
With regard to our IFD measure, one might argue
that the fact that participants could only change func-
tionaldomainsbetween the first andsecondsimulation
sessions limited their opportunity to develop broad
functional experiences. In real-life organizations, in-
dividuals may vary more widely in this regard (e.g., de
Vries, Walter, van der Vegt, & Essens, 2014). This con-
cern is somewhat mitigated, however, by the fact that
IFD reflects a collective property at the multiteam sys-
tem level. As a result, there was sufficient variation
in IFD between the multiteam systems in our sample
to meaningfully test the proposed relationships. Re-
latedly, there may be real-life instances in which low
(high) IFD does not translate into deep (broad) func-
tional knowledge to the same degree as in the present
study (e.g., repetitive, routine tasks). As multiteam sys-
tems typically deal with complex and uncertain issues
(Mathieu et al., 2001), however, we believe such situ-
ations will be relatively uncommon in this context.
Further, although our computerized decision-
making simulation enabled hypotheses testing in
a relatively controlled setting, it came at the cost of
reduced generalizability. We tried to mitigate this
concern by using actual employees (i.e., Air Force
officers) for whom multiteam system performance
affected career advancement. In addition, the simu-
lation was a realistic exercise that closely resembled
participants’ regular work. Moreover, although this
study did not followmultiteam systems over a period
of years, it was not a short-term laboratory investi-
gationof strangers that cooperated for just a fewhours.
Multiteam systems worked together for five consec-
utive weeks on different tasks (including the LDS).
Nevertheless, generalization of our findings to longer-
term, non-military contexts is an open question that
can only be addressed through constructive replica-
tion in diverse field settings.
Otherpotential concernsmayrelate toouruseofLDS
computer log files to derive key measures. This mea-
surement approach fit the present manuscript’s focus
on IFD’s behavioral outcomes and helped us to over-
come key weakness associated with more subjective,
survey-based or observational instruments (e.g., recall
and response bias, social desirability [Schwarz, 1999]).
On the other hand, this approach prevented us from
capturing fine-grained (e.g., cognitive or affective)
mechanisms and micro-processes through which IFD
may translate into horizontal coordination and aspira-
tional behavior (see de Vries et al., 2014; Lanaj et al.,
2013). Similarly, we were unable to depict the specific
means through which integration teams enacted verti-
cal coordinated action (e.g., through face-to-face com-
munication, formal documents, or visual cues).
Additional research employing alternative (e.g.,
survey- or observation-based) instruments may be
useful to explore such detailed micro-mediation
processes and, thus, to further understand the re-
lationships illustrated in the present study.
Finally, this study’s relatively small effect sizes
may lead to concerns about our results’ practical
significance—although we believe the binomial ef-
fect size displays presented above alleviate such
reservations to some extent. In addition, Prentice
and Miller (1992: 160–161) have argued that even
small effect sizes (in statistical terms) may be “im-
pressive” when they show that “a minimal manip-
ulation of the independent variable still accounts
for some variance in the dependent variable.” In the
present case, we note that a relatively small devel-
opment of IFD within a limited range of functional
domains over a limited time frame was sufficient to
shape key processes relevant for multiteam system
performance. Thus, our findings reveal IFD’s
distinct potential (in combination with vertical
2016 1839de Vries, Hollenbeck, Davison, Walter, and van der Vegt
coordinated action) to influence multiteam systems’
functioning.
Future Research
Beyond addressing limitations, future research
could extend our conceptual model in several im-
portant ways. For example, such research could
broaden the current manuscript’s focus on IFD’s be-
havioral consequences by incorporating antecedent
conditions that lead to the development of IFD.
Scholars could examine, for example,whether IFD is
more effective when members voluntarily choose to
switch functional domains to broaden their func-
tional knowledge, rather than being forced to rotate
because they performed poorly in their original
function (see Tesluk & Jacobs, 1998).
Subsequent research could also explore task and
contextual characteristics as alternative contingency
factors for the relationship between IFD and multi-
team system performance. IFD’s positive conse-
quences (through horizontal coordination), for
example, may intensify with higher interteam task
interdependence, because multiteam systems may
thenplace stronger demands onmembers’ capacities
for aligning activities across component teams (Joshi
et al., 2009). Highly uncertain and complex envi-
ronments, on the other hand, may place a premium
on functionally narrow members with deep knowl-
edge for substantive, high-impact tasks, rather than
functionally broad members with more superficial
perspectives. Hence, IFD’s negative performance
implications (through reduced aspirational behav-
ior) may be particularly salient in such environ-
ments. Additional research could build on these
notions to further complete our understanding of
IFD’s role in multiteam settings.
In addition, it may be interesting to extend our
conceptual model by investigating antecedents of
vertical coordinated action. Clearly, integration teams
in the present study differed markedly in the extent to
which they engaged in this type of behavior. Some of
these teams, for example, proactively communicated
their system-wide insights toward component teams
(an example of high vertical coordinated action),
whereas otherswithdrew themselves fromcomponent
teams and enforced their own, independent perspec-
tives on task completion within the multiteam system
(anexampleof lowverticalcoordinatedaction; seealso
Davison et al., 2012). Such differences may, for exam-
ple, stemfromvariability in integration teams’ taskand
goal orientations (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) or in-
tegration teammembers’dominance andassertiveness
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). Empirically examin-
ing these ideas may advance our understanding of the
micro-foundations of vertical coordinated action as
a key aspect of multiteam system effectiveness.
Practical Implications
The challenge of effectively coordinating multiple
specialized teams involved in joint tasks has long
troubled management practice (Mathieu et al., 2001;
Smith et al., 1995). Despite repeated efforts to improve
such coordination, for example, Donahue and Tuohy
(2006) concluded that the emergency response opera-
tions following hurricane Andrew in 1992, the Okla-
homaCitybombing in1995, the9/11 terrorist attacks in
2001, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 all suffered from
duplicate and conflicting efforts among involved
teams and organizations. Similar problems have
been documented within the logistics and health
care fields, with scholars noting “there seems to be
a general lack of managerial ability to integrate and
coordinate the intricate network of business re-
lationships” (Kanda & Deshmukh, 2008: 317) and
“despite their efforts to collaborate, professionals
are lost in translation across healthcare boundaries”
(Kerosuo, 2010: 372).
The present study addresses this problem and
has important implications for the management of
multiteam systems (aswell as traditional organizations
designed according to multiteam system principles;
Millikin, Hom, & Manz, 2010). Based on our results,
for example, it appears possible to improve hori-
zontal coordination and multiteam system perfor-
mance by selecting members with broad functional
experiences or by promoting such experiences
through training opportunities and appropriate as-
signments. Importantly, several off-the-shelf solu-
tions are available for enhancing IFD, including job
rotation and personnel transfer schemes (Griffin &
Hauser, 1996; Leenders & Wierenga, 2002), career
development trajectories (Raskas&Hambrick, 1992),
and cross-training strategies (Cannon-Bowers et al.,
1998; Marks et al., 2002). By increasing IFD, multi-
team system leadersmay enable component teams to
bridge language, thought-world, and goal differences
that may otherwise prove detrimental.
By itself, selecting or training functionally broad
members is unlikely to guarantee high multiteam
system performance. Our results suggest that with-
out effective integration team support (through ver-
tical coordinated action), horizontal coordination
may be too complex and burdensome even for multi-
team systems with high IFD. In fact, IFD may even
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diminish multiteam system performance in such
situations by lowering a system’s aspirational be-
havior. Again,multiteam system leadersmay rely on
well-developed interventions to promote vertical
coordinated action, thus realizing IFD’s potentials
and circumventing its downsides. “Frame-of-refer-
ence” training, for example,mayprovide component
and integration teams with a standardized language
that enables efficient coordination across a multi-
team system’s hierarchical layers (Firth et al., 2014:
814). Similarly, “strategizing” or “coordinating” in-
terventions (i.e., training integrative leaders in pro-
viding component teams with feedback on their
effectiveness in the multiteam system) may improve
integration teams’ capacity for vertical coordinated
action (DeChurch&Marks, 2006: 312). By combining
high IFD with effective vertical coordination, multi-
team systems may be able to live up to their full po-
tential and succeed in meeting the challenges of the
environments in which they operate.
Finally, limits associated with time and training
budgets imply trade-offs associated with developing
IFD, and the present study informs organizational
leaders’ decision making in this regard. If a multi-
team system is vertically well-coordinated, in par-
ticular, substantial performance advantages may be
realized by developing members’ IFD. In contrast, if
a system is lacking effective vertical coordination,
increasing IFDmay entail considerable performance
risks. Management could, then, prioritize the de-
velopment of vertical coordinated action, before
devoting resources to strengthening IFD.
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